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The objective of this paper is to develop a model to determine the price formation of 
wholesale electricity markets. For that purpose, we model wholesale electricity prices 
depending on the prices of fuels (coal and natural gas) and of CO2 emission 
allowances using a Markov Switching Regression. We apply the model to wholesale 
electricity prices in the UK and in Germany. While British electricity prices are quite 
well explained by short-run cost factors, we find a decoupling between electricity 
prices and fuel costs in Germany. This may be evidence that the German electricity 
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  1  Introduction  
Electricity markets differ from other commodity markets in various respects. Demand for electricity is 
inelastic in the short term, storing it is expensive, parts of the value chain exhibit characteristics of 
natural monopolies and reliable electricity supply has high macroeconomic importance. In the 
potentially competitive wholesale sector, remaining vertical and horizontal integration as well as the 
widespread existence of national incumbents are often providing significant market power. Whether 
this market power is actually exercised in one market or the other is an open issue. To detect strategic 
behaviour it would be desirable to compare the cost curves for each market participant to its actual 
bids. But the true cost functions are private information. In addition, individual bid curves are 
unavailable for scientific inquiries in many markets.  
Nevertheless to enquire whether wholesale electricity markets determine justifiable prices, various 
indirect approaches have been proposed. Analyzing bidding data of electricity auctions, Hortacsu and 
Puller (2004), Wolfram (1998) and Sweeting (2004) are able to provide evidence for strategic bidding. 
Sweeting (2004) finds that bidding behaviour became consistent with tacit collusion after 1995-96 in 
the English and Welch wholesale market. Studying the bidding behaviour of National Power and 
PowerGen in the English and Welch market, Wolfram (1998) provides evidence for strategic bidding. 
And Hortacsu and Puller (2005) compares firm-level marginal cost and bids in the Texas electricity 
spot market, finding that smaller firms especially were bidding strategically. Wolfram (1999) 
estimates the price-cost margin in the British market, finding that the strictly positive margins were 
lower than implied by theoretical models, which she explained by regulation, threat of entry and 
supplier-customer relations. Finally, Müsgens (2006), Schwarz and Lang (2006) and Hirschhausen et 
al. (2007) simulate the marginal cost of the German electricity system and compare those to the actual 
prices. All three studies find that prices decoupled from short-run marginal cost. The simulations of 
electricity generation cost are based on extensive models of the German market using large-scale 
power plant databases. Essentially, the models optimize the German system with respect to the actual 
demand. The marginal costs of the last required generator set the marginal cost of the entire system. 
Despite the accurate representation of the markets Swider et al. (2007) challenge the validity of the 
marginal-cost simulation results as substantial uncertainties arise from the lack of data and simplifying 
assumptions. In this paper we propose a different approach. Instead of calculating the absolute 
deviation of the electricity price from the respective generation cost, our goal is to obtain a relative 
indicator for the cost-reflectiveness of national electricity prices. Therefore, we first set up a stylized 
model of the marginal electricity generation cost. In a second step, the model is estimated over time 
assuming that prices equal marginal cost. Finally, the coefficients and the residuals of the estimation 
are compared across countries to assess where and when prices are best explained by their 
fundamentals. Thus, the model should also be able to identify deviations from competitive price 
setting. The paper is structured in the following way: the next section introduces some stylized facts 
on the countries to which we apply the model: the UK and Germany. Section 3 presents the model. 
Section 4 presents the results and an interpretation and section 5 concludes.  
  22  Data  
The analysis is carried out to compare the price formation in the UK and German electricity market. In 
terms of size, the German is comparable to the UK electricity system (see Table 1). Conventional 
thermal power plants account for most of the electricity generation in both countries (65% in Germany 
and 77% in the UK). One obvious difference between both systems is that the UK does not use lignite 
for which it compensates by an increased share of natural gas. Market structure and design in both 
countries differ markedly. Whereas the UK has two decades of experience with market opening and 
regulation, Germany has addressed sector reforms only in the first part of this decade, and a regulator 
was set up in mid-2005. The four privately owned transmission system operators in Germany have 
significant stakes in generation (together 80% of total capacity) and distribution. The integration of the 
two major German players - E.on and RWE - with their natural gas affiliates further increases their 
dominating position. In the UK the situation is more balanced. The transmission system operator is 
unbundled and regulation is effective. The nine biggest generation companies together own only 68% 
of the capacities. Although these are integrated with electricity and gas suppliers, none of them has a 
position comparable to the “big four” in Germany. 
Table 1: Gross electricity generation (2005) 
 Germany UK
Hydro power plants  4 % 2 %
Nuclear power plants  26 % 20 %
Coal-fired power stations  21 % 34 %
Lignite-fired power stations  23 %
Natural gas-fired power stations  11 % 38 %
Others  15 % 6 %
Annual gross electricity generation in TWh  620 401
Source: Eurostat 
Both wholesale markets are particularly suited to be analyzed using the model described in the next 
section as: First, neither of these markets is endowed with significant hydro power capacity. This is an 
advantage since the model is unable to reproduce the dynamic opportunity cost assessment required 
for analyzing the marginal cost of a hydro power plant. And second, both countries feature electricity 
wholesale markets that provide reference prices.  
Hourly spot electricity prices for Germany are obtained from the European Energy Exchange in 
Leipzig (EEX). There prices are formed by day-ahead two-side one-shot sealed-bid uniform-price 
auctions. UK half-hourly spot prices at the UKPX, by contrast, are obtained in 48 hour continuous 
trading until a half hour ahead of delivery. 
Table 2: Summary of the data sample (February 2002 to December 2006) 
  Germany  United  Kingdom 
   Source  Mean  Variance  Source  Mean  Variance 
Electricity off-peak   €/MWhel EEX 29.5 160 UKPX  31.4  220
Electricity peak   €/MWhel EEX 48.3 839 UKPX  44.9  764
Gas spot price   €/MWhth TTF (NL)  13.5 26 NBP  14.1  70
Coal spot price   €/MWhth ARA 5.8 1 ARA  5.8  1
Emission allowance   €/tCO2 EEX 6.8 90 EEX  6.8  90
  3 
Because the model (described in the next section) is only meaningful in the short and medium run, 
daily price notations are used for all commodities. As no daily German gas and coal prices are 
available for the entire sample, the respective values of the Dutch markets for natural gas (TTF) and 
coal (ARA) were selected.
3 The sample contains data from February 2002 to December 2006. Because 
gas and coal prices are only available for working days, week-ends and holidays are omitted from the 
sample.
4 The fuel prices are converted into €/MWhth to ease the interpretation. The respective data 
sources for the three commodities for Germany and the UK are summarized in Table 2. 
Figure 2 depicts the series of spot prices. Peak and off-peak electricity prices approximately doubled 
between 2002 and 2006. Gas prices also doubled, whereas coal prices reached their initial level at the 
end of 2006.
5 Emission allowance prices increased from 10 € to 30 € to fall back to 10 €.  
 
Figure 1: Development of the spot price series 2002-2006 (in €/MWh) 











































3  Model  
In contrast to other homogenous goods, electricity can be generated by a set of different production 
technologies with very different marginal cost. The non-storability of electricity allows that large 
nuclear power plants with low variable costs, coal-fired generators with medium variable costs, and 
                                                      
3 It should be noted, that gas and especially coal prices in Germany should exceed Dutch fuel prices by some constant 
because of transportation cost. 
4 This has the positive side effect of reducing weekly seasonalities significantly. 
5 Datastream derives the daily coal price notations by converting the monthly coal prices in dollar into euro using the daily 
exchange rate. Thus, the increasing dollar-euro exchange rate limited the effect of rising coal prices for European coal 
consumers. 
  4small gas turbines with high variable costs coexist. Because the differences of marginal costs of power 
plants of the same technology are small compared to the cost difference between dissimilar 
technologies, the marginal cost curve of the entire electricity system can be approximated by a 
stepwise function (see Figure 1).
6
 
Figure 2: Stylized example of the stepwise marginal cost function 
 
Based on this assumption, one can model the electricity price at time t as the marginal cost of the last 
required technology to meet the demand. In the short run the costs of a power plant should be highly 
correlated with its fuel and emission costs. Since the fuel efficiency of technologies changes rather 
slowly, fuel and emission costs are predominantly determined by the respective prices. Thus, a time 
series model that endogenously infers the cost structures of each class of power plants and that 
deduces which class is marginal at each point in time can be set up using fuel, emission and electricity 
prices as only input. Generally the model consists of two procedures: a routine that decides which 
class of power plants sets the price (i.e., is marginal) and a mechanism that reproduces the electricity 
price formation for each class.  
For each technology St=1,...,m we assume the marginal costs at time  T t … 1 ∈  to be the sum of a 
weighted linear combination of the k explanatory variables β(St)×Xt and a stochastic component εt(St). 
The set of explanatory variables stored in the k columns of the matrix X might contain for example a 
constant, a time trend, different dummy variables as well as gas, oil, coal and emission certificate 
prices.  
  
                                                      
6 Typical non-dispatchable must-run generation are wind, run-of-river hydro and combined heat and power plants (in winter). 
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When the process that determines the marginal technology at time t is assumed to be Markovian
7, (1) 
can be estimated using a Markov Switching Regression. To do this, the model has to be converted into 
state space form with the states (or regimes) of the model representing the different technologies. To 
make the model computable, the Markovian Process is specified as ( ) j i t t p j S i S P , 1 | = = = − , i.e. with 
time invariant exogenous switching probabilities.
8 Thus the model is fully described by  
m S X p t S t t S t el t t ... 1 , , , = ∀ + × = ε β          ( 2 )  
() m j i p j S i S P j i t t ≤ ∀ = = = − , , | , 1        ( 3 )  
where Xt is the (k×T) matrix of explanatory variables, 
T S β is the state dependent (1×k) row vector 
( n S S S t t t , 2 , 1 , ,... , β β β ), and P is a (m× m) matrix containing the probability to switch from state i to state 
j.  
The presented stylized merit order (see Figure 1) implies that only four types of power plants with 
different cost structures exist.
9 The marginal cost for each of these technologies only depends on its 
fuel consumption, emissions and non-fuel variable costs. As the marginal cost of coal power plants 
should not depend on the gas price certain zero restrictions on 
T S β can be imposed. The interpretation 
of the remaining coefficients is then straightforward: The constant represents the non-fuel variable 
cost of this type of power plants. The fuel coefficient for the used fuel is the inverse of the heat rate of 
this type of power plants (when electricity price and fuel price are both measured in the same unit, i.e. 
€/MWh). And the coefficient for the emission certificate prices represents the amount of emissions per 
unit of electricity.
10 An issue which we do not address in this context is the endogeneity problem. That 
is, we ignore that gas and emission allowance prices also depend on electricity prices. This has been 
kept in mind for the interpretation of the results.  
In our non-linear model it is difficult to deduce theoretically the distribution of the parameters 
conditioned on the data. This challenge can be addressed by using the Gibbs sampling technique.
11 
The idea is to repeatedly draw each parameter conditioning on the data and all other parameters. This 
procedure is iterated a large number of times, always conditioning on the latest draws of the other 
                                                      
7 A Markovian process is characterized by the fact that each observation only depends on the last period realization. 
8 Including demand and weather conditions into the switching probabilities could improve the estimation and modelling 
switching cost as threshold variables in the state-equation might make the estimates even more realistic. The probably tricky 
implementation is, however, left to further research. 
9 Must-run generation like wind and run-of-river hydro are not considered as they can be considered as a reduction of net 
electricity demand. 
10 The units match accordingly: €/MWhel = €/MWhel+MWhel/MWhth×€/MWhth+tCO2/MWhel×€/tCO2
11 See Krolzig (1997). 
  6parameters. To estimate (2) and (3) via Gibbs sampling, the density function of the model can be 
separated as:  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) T T T T T T T S S T T S S T X y S g S P g S X y g X y P S g
t t t t : 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 , | | , , | , , | , , , Σ = Σ β β  (4) 
Therefore one proceeds in four steps:  
1  Deduce  ( ) T T T X y S g : 1 : 1 : 1 , |  from  ( ) T T T X y S g : 1 : 1 , |  and  ( ) T t t t X y S S g : 1 : 1 1 , , | +  by backward 
iteration. Thereby   is calculated from  which is 
obtained by the Hamilton filter. 
( T t t t X y S S g : 1 : 1 1 , , | + ) ) ( T t t X y S g : 1 : 1 , |
2  Draw the beta-distributed switching probabilities P given  .  T S : 1
3  Draw the 
T S β given  , ,  and T y : 1 T X : 1 T S : 1 T S Σ . 
4  Draw the 
T S Σ given 
T S β ,    and .  T S : 1 T y : 1 T X : 1
 
A detailed description of the four steps can be found in Schweri (2004) who also provides the 
corresponding Matlab code.  
4   Results  
4.1  Estimation Results  
To estimate (2) & (3) a sensible choice of the dependent variable i.e., the electricity price series is 
crucial. As demand is highly volatile throughout the day one could expect that up to five regime 
switches (nuclear->coal->gas->coal->nuclear) occur every day. Therefore, using a continuous hour-
by-hour series is inadequate because regime persistency (P(i,i)>>P(i,j)) is decisive for stable estimates. 
A better choice is to separate the continuous series into 24 day-by-day series each of which represents 
one hour of the day. However, estimating (2) & (3) for 24 (or even 48) series is impractical especially 
because some of those series are very similar (e.g. 3
rd and 4
th hour data) and the estimation procedure 
is computationally burdensome. Reducing the number of series to two while keeping most information 
is attained by drawing on a weighted average of peak (8am-8pm) and off-peak (8pm-8am) electricity 
prices. The optimal weighting vector (in terms of variance explained) is obtained by principle 
component analysis.
12 Further on, dates with electricity prices above 200€/MWh are excluded as 
extreme price-spikes would possibly distort the analysis and cannot be explained by fuel cost 
fundamentals.
13   
We estimate (2) & (3) for the off-peak and peak series for the German (EEX) and the British (UKPX) 
market. In all four cases (EEX off-peak, EEX peak, UKPX off-peak and UKPX peak) we apply a 
model in which spot electricity prices are explained by spot gas prices, spot coal prices and the 
                                                      
12 For details see Härdle and Simar (2003). 
13 Even burning expensive oil (50€/barrel) in an inefficient generator (heat rate of 20%) would only justify marginal cost of ~ 
150€/MWhel (0.625 barrel/MWhth x 5 MWhth/MWhel x 50 €/barrel). For the modelling of electricity price spikes see Lang 
and Schwarz (2007). 
  7respective emission allowance price. Oil prices and a trend are omitted after initial estimations 
suggested that they are not significant for any state. Variance and all β coefficients are selected to be 
state dependent.
14 To capture the effect that switching from one marginal technology to another only 
occurs when demand or supply conditions change significantly some persistency was predefined.
15  
Choosing the number of states is driven by three considerations: goodness-of-fit, interpretability with 
respect to the stylized merit order and comparability. The goodness-of-fit is measured in terms of the 
Schwartz information criterion (BIC). The BIC suggests that, depending on the case, either three or 
four regimes are appropriate.
 16 The assumed stylized merit order suggests, that there are three regimes 
in off-peak (base, coal, gas) and three regimes in peak (coal, gas, spike). For ease of presentation and 
to obtain results that are comparable the paper thus focuses on the three state specification. Using 
informative priors it is possible to induce model outcomes that are plausible with respect to the 
stylized merit order. In all four cases (EEX off-peak, EEX peak, UKPX off-peak and UKPX peak) 
certain coefficients are constrained to zero by applying tight prior distributions with mean zero.
17
Setting the mean and variance priors for the coefficients as well as the starting values according to 
Table 6 the model is estimated using the described procedure.
18 This selection induces that in each 
case three technology regimes (in off-peak: base, coal and gas; in peak: coal, gas and spike) exist that 
can be clearly distinguished. The coal and gas price coefficient priors, for example, imply that each 
fuel is only significant in the corresponding regime. 
 
                                                      
14 Note that state dependent variance is straightforward since high electricity price regimes are characterized by higher 
variance. 
15 The probability to remain in the current state was set to 0.67 whereas the probability to switch to each other state was 
adjusted to 0.16. Giving the prior a modest variance of approximately 0.1, this implies that the beta-distribution of the pij - 
values is set to u1 = 2 and u2 = 1 on the main diagonal and u1 = 1 and u2 = 6 beyond the main diagonal. 
16 The BIC has been calculated for each case for one to four regimes using a model specification with non-informative priors 
for the entire sample. While for the UK off-peak case the BIC favours a three-regime specifications, a four-regime 
specification is preferred for all other cases. This reflects the higher diversity of the German off-peak generation structure and 
should be kept in mind for the interpretation. 
17 In each of the steps the posterior distribution p(θ|y) is given by the likelihood function L(θ|y) times the prior distribution 
g(θ): p(θ|y)= g(θ) × L(θ|y). 
18 Due to the identification restriction the sorting of the no-fuel state has been crucial. Setting it as the first state implied it to 
have the lowest constant of all states and thus resulted in a ”baseload state”. 
  8Figure 3: Coefficient densities for the UK off-peak case (informative priors) 







































































































The estimation results (see Table 3) indicate a good fit of the model and the estimated regime 
characteristics allow for a straightforward interpretation: First, each state can meaningfully be 
attributed to a unique technology. Second, the average electricity prices in each regime are sorted 
according to the presented stylized merit order. Third, the estimated parameters are in an intuitive 
order of magnitude. In all four cases the coal coefficient in the coal state is always bigger than the gas 
coefficient in the gas state, and the emissions allowance price has a stronger influence on the coal then 
on the gas state. And fourth, almost all coefficient densities have a single maximum and are 
approximately normally distributed. This is illustrated at the UK off-peak example in Figure 3 where 
only the emission allowance coefficient has two maxima.
19 This indicates that the model is generally 
well specified but that potentially two different coal states (e.g., “new” and “old”) with different 
emission intensity might exist. 
Each of the four technology regimes (“base”, “coal”, “gas” and “spike”) features unique 
characteristics: In the base regime electricity prices modestly depends on both fuel prices and 
emission allowance prices. Whether the gas and coal price dependence can be explained by ramping 
and balancing cost that enter the marginal cost of typical base-load power plants (nuclear, wind, 
lignite) or whether this is due to endogeneity (e.g., base-load electricity as substitute for coal and gas) 
cannot be decided. Interestingly the base state is the dominant state in the UK (80%) while it plays 
only a modest role in Germany (38%). The coal states in all four cases feature highly significant 
influences of coal prices (1.57-4.10), insignificant influence of gas prices and a highly significant 
influences of emission allowance prices (0.94-1.63). The average electricity prices in the coal state 
vary between around 40 in the UK off peak and 30 in all other cases. In the gas state all but the coal 
  9price coefficients are significantly positive. The gas price coefficients vary between 0.79 and 1.87, and 
the emission allowance price coefficients between 0.87 and 1.37. Finally the spike state is 
characterized by high prices, high variance and low frequency. 
 
Table 3: Results of the Switching Regression with informative priors 
 freq  βConstant βCoal βGas βCO2 Mean 
Germany Peak  (R²=80%, FStat=-43.6) 
State1 (“Coal)  30%  7.4 (+/-4.6) 2.00 (+/-.92) 0.00  (+/-.02)  1.63  (+/-.13) 33.42
State2 (“Gas”)  57%  14.7 (+/-3.5) 0.00 (+/-.02) 1.87  (+/-.26)  1.37  (+/-.14) 44.64
State3 (“Spike”)  13%  91.9 (+/-6.1) -0.41 (+/-.61) -0.18  (+/-.43)  0.93  (+/-.43) 97.05
Germany Off-Peak  (R²=90%, FStat=39.5) 
State1 (“Base)  38%  6.8 (+/-2.9) 1.11 (+/-.43) 0.35  (+/-.28)  0.76  (+/-.13) 22.8
State2 (“Coal”)  34%  13.7 (+/-2.8) 1.57 (+/-.54) 0.01 (+/-.02)  0.94  (+/-.16) 29.52
State3 (“Gas”)  28%  19.8 (+/-1.9) 0.00 (+/-.02) 0.71 (+/-.13)  0.94  (+/-.11) 38.6
UK Peak  (R²=87%, FStat=66.0) 
State1 (“Coal)  37%  2.6 (+/-1.5) 4.10 (+/-.27) 0.01 (+/-.02)  1.19 (+/-.07) 29.55
State2 (“Gas”)  53%  13.2 (+/-2.4) 0.00 (+/-.02) 1.79 (+/-.20) 0.87  (+/-.12) 45.12
State3 (“Spike”)  10%  89.2 (+/-6.2) -0.59 (+/-.63) 0.98 (+/-.30)  -0.30 (+/-.45) 103.64
UK Off-Peak  (R²=95%, FStat=-28.6) 
State1 (“Base)  80%  4.3 (+/-.9) 1.59 (+/-.17) 0.82 (+/-.09) 0.77  (+/-.03) 26.87
State2 (“Coal”)  11%  9.2 (+/-4.5) 2.72 (+/-.62) 0.01 (+/-.02)  1.08 (+/-.17) 39.37
State3 (“Gas”)  9%  16.4 (+/-4.0) 0.00 (+/-.02) 0.83 (+/-.14) 0.87  (+/-.28) 62.15
(+/-) = Half of the two-sided 95% confidence interval width. Bold coefficients are significantly 
different from zero. 
FStat= the F statistic for the test of the null hypothesis of an unrestricted versus the alternative of a 
restricted model (6 restrictions). This statistic is purely illustrative as tight priors are no restrictions in 
the strict sense and the distribution of errors is autocorrelated and encompasses heteroskedastisity. 
 
While the presented model outcomes fit well in the picture of the stylized merit order, also some 
reservations have to be made: First, it is difficult to explain that, despite the straightforward 
identification of technology regimes, the cost structures of the technologies are unstable across 
countries and load periods. In fact, the 95% confidence intervals for the same coefficient in the same 
regime do often not intersect. For example the confidence interval of the gas price coefficient in the 
gas regime for the German peak (1.87+/-.26) does not intersect with the same interval for the German 
off-peak (0.71+/-.13). Second, some coefficients are far off their expected values. For example the 
inverse heat rate of a gas fired power plant should be somewhere around 2.5 but the estimated values 
are significantly smaller. And third, the assumption of normality for the residuals has to be rejected for 
eight of the twelve cases at the five percent significance level (see Table 7). 
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19 The results for all other cases are to be obtained from the author upon request. These deviations of the estimation results from expectations might have two potential causes: Either, 
the model is misspecified with respect to the real marginal cost of electricity production, and/or, the 
underlying assumption that electricity prices are based on marginal cost is wrong. While the first 
explanation probably holds to some degree,
20 there are reasons to belief that the second cause is not 
implausible, neither. As the cost structure of a national power generation systems is rather stable, 
intertemporal and international comparison of the model outcomes allows tracking differences in the 
deviations of electricity prices from marginal cost. 
 
Figure 4: Regime probabilities in for the UK off-peak case (informative priors) 











































4.2  Intertemporal and international comparison of price formation  
The first fact that merits noting is that the “goodness of fit” of the model is better in the UK case in 
both load periods (see Table 4). Using the Kruskal-Wallis test this discovery is supported by finding 
that the median errors are significantly bigger in the German case.  Second, the constant is smaller and 
the fuel price coefficients are generally bigger in the corresponding UK cases, indicating that fuel cost 
explain a higher proportion of the UK than of the German electricity prices. Furthermore, the 
coefficients variance is generally smaller in the UK.  
Thus we find that in general the UK market is better captured by the regime switching model than the 
German market. The better performance of the proposed model for the UK might be explained by 
several features: First, electricity generation in the UK relies more on the two modelled fuels (34% of 
gas and coal in the German electricity production vs. 72% in the UK) and estimations suggest that 
                                                      
20 One cannot expect that a stochastic model with a very parsimonious specification can completely track the marginal cost of 
a complex electricity system. Probably, increasing the number of technologies (i.e., states) and including more data (e.g. 
  11more than the considered three technology-regimes might be present in the German market. Second, 
the UK natural gas market and the UK electricity market feature a stronger link via common demand 
drivers and substitution than the Dutch natural gas and the German electricity market.
21  Third, 
Germany is better integrated in the European electricity market than the UK leading to a stronger 
influence of foreign power and fuel prices that are not considered in the stylized model. Fourth, the 
UKPX price may include more information as the gate closure in the UK is only one hour ahead of 
schedule, compared to Germany where it is on the day before (12am for all hours). Fifth, the German 
electricity prices have to reflect the higher extra-costs for reliability under stochastic wind and heat 
guided combined heat and power (CHP) electricity production. Sixth, the start up cost and cost for 
reserve capacity are more important in an electricity system that is based to a larger degree on coal and 
lignite units. As those cost types are not considered in the model, the price-cost difference is 
potentially overestimated in the German market. And finally the British market is considered to be 
more competitive leading to more short-run cost dependent electricity prices. 
 
Table 4: Goodness of fit (R²) of the regime switching model with informative priors 
 Germany  UK  KW ( ( ) ( )
2 2 ∑ ∑ > UK t GER t t t ε ε ) 
Peak  80% 87%  54.89***
Off-Peak  90% 95%  167.69***
 
The intertemporal comparison is also interesting. Estimating the model for two sub-samples 2002-
2004 and 2005-2006 the constants rose significantly from the earlier to the later stage (Table 5). 
Consequently a significant proportion of the electricity price increases in both the UK and Germany 
were not driven by fuel and emission cost increases. This development can be attributed to two 
factors: First, it has been argued that in the sample period electricity pricing switched from over-
capacity driven short-run marginal cost (SRMC) pricing after the liberalization to a less fuel cost 
dependent long-run marginal cost pricing. This switching has been attributed to the reduction of 
excess capacities in the process of liberalization. A second explanation might be that increasing 
concentration in the wholesale sector eased the exercise of market power to raise prices.  
 
Table 5: Regime-dependent constant in the early (2002-04) and late (2005-06) sub-sample 
  Germany Off-peak  Germany Peak  UK Off-peak  UK Peak 
State  1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
2002-04  5.5  14.2  17.8  4.6 9.3  17.1 8 13.1  86.8 2 12.3  90.7 
2005-06 11.6 13.6 19.8 11.3 13.9  17  7.4  15.4  101.5 5.6  10.9 96.3 
                                                                                                                                                                      
demand) could improve the outcomes. 
21 Note, that also the feedback effects of the British electricity price on the British gas price might play a role. Knowing that 
the UK natural gas market is more mature and natural gas prices are less linked to the oil price than in Germany it could well 
be that endogeneity UK > endogeneity Germany. 
  12 
In Figure 3 the marginal state for every point in time as estimated in the model with informative priors 
for the UK off-peak case is depicted: what is striking in this example is that the dominance of the base 
regime ceased in the second half of 2005 while the coal and gas regime gained importance. This 
structural change (that is to be found in all four cases) might have been due to a fuel switch caused by 
high emission certificate prices or lower base load generation margins produced by increasing base 
load demand and/or decreasing base load generation capacities. 
5  Conclusion  
The paper compares the wholesale price formation mechanism in the UK and Germany. Applying a 
Markov switching regression we provide evidence that the electricity wholesale prices in the UK are 
more closely related to the prices of coal, gas and emission allowances than their German 
counterparts. These differences in the German and British price formation mechanism shed light on 
the insufficient integration of these markets. In addition it is shown that the frequency at which high-
price fuels became marginal increased in both countries. Given that demand did not increase 
significantly in the sample period, this can be interpreted as a leftward shift of the supply function, 
indicating a reduction of available cheap production capacities. Furthermore we provide evidence that 
non-fuel-based coefficients explain some of the electricity price increases. These findings are in line 
with conjectures that the initially strong link between short-run marginal cost and prices gradually 
vanished due to decreasing generation margins or increasing exercise of market power. Although, 
several extensions remain desirable the presented new approach to model electricity wholesale prices 
based on fuel and emission prices proved very powerful for understanding the nonlinear nature of 
electricity price formation. 
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7  Appendix  
 
Table 6: Prior mean (prior variance) and starting values of the model with informative priors 
 Off-peak  Peak 
  Base  Coal Natural  Gas Coal Natural  Gas Spike 
βconst 5 (10)  10 (10)  15 (10)  5 (10)  10 (10)  100 (10) 
βcoal 0 (0.1)  3 (1)  0 (0.0001)  3 (1)  0 (0.0001)  0 (0. 1) 
βgas 0 (0.1)  0 (0.0001)  2 (1)  0 (0.0001)  2 (1)  0 (0. 1) 
βC02 0 (0.1)  1 (1)  1 (1)  1 (1)  1 (1)  0 (1) 
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Table 7: Jarque-Bera Test Statistics for the Normality of the Residuals 
  State 1  State 2  State 3 


















*** the null hypothesis of residuals normality can be rejected at 
the 10%, 5%, 1% significance level. 
[] the null cannot be rejected at 
the 10% significance level. 
 
Table 8: List of Abbreviations 
EEX  European Energy Exchange or respectively the electricity spot price thereof 
UKPX  UK Power Exchange or respectively the electricity spot price thereof 
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